@orangecheck/agent-core / VerifyActionInput
Interface: VerifyActionInput
Defined in: agent-core/src/verify.ts:280
Extends
Properties
| Property | Type | Description | Inherited from | Defined in |
|---|---|---|---|---|
<a id="property-action"></a> action | ActionEnvelope | - | - | agent-core/src/verify.ts:281 |
<a id="property-content"></a> content? | Uint8Array<ArrayBufferLike> | - | - | agent-core/src/verify.ts:300 |
<a id="property-decryptscopeswith"></a> decryptScopesWith? | { device_id: string; secretKey: Uint8Array; } | v1.2 private-scope decryption key. Applied to the root delegation AND every subdelegation in the chain that carries scopes_encrypted. If a link is private-mode and no key matches its recipients, verification fails E_SCOPES_UNREADABLE — the chain's transitive narrowing cannot be checked without the plaintext. | - | agent-core/src/verify.ts:311 |
decryptScopesWith.device_id | string | - | - | agent-core/src/verify.ts:312 |
decryptScopesWith.secretKey | Uint8Array | - | - | agent-core/src/verify.ts:313 |
<a id="property-delegation"></a> delegation | DelegationEnvelope | The ROOT delegation rooting the authority chain. Always required. | - | agent-core/src/verify.ts:283 |
<a id="property-maxchaindepth"></a> maxChainDepth? | number | Maximum permitted chain depth (number of subdelegations). Default DEFAULT_MAX_CHAIN_DEPTH (5). Verifiers MAY lower; MUST NOT raise silently above their advertised cap. Chains exceeding this fail with E_SUBDELEGATION_DEPTH_EXCEEDED before any per-link work is performed. | - | agent-core/src/verify.ts:299 |
<a id="property-resolveanchorblockheight"></a> resolveAnchorBlockHeight? | (env: | ActionEnvelope | RevocationEnvelope) => number | null | If action and revocation are both OTS-anchored, pass a function that returns the comparable block height of each via proof parsing. Defaults: use envelope.ots.block_height. | - | agent-core/src/verify.ts:303 |
<a id="property-revocations"></a> revocations? | RevocationEnvelope[] | Revocations to evaluate against the delegation (or, for an action, every link in its chain). Fetch these from kind-30085 by #delegation. | VerifyBase.revocations | agent-core/src/verify.ts:68 |
<a id="property-scopemode"></a> scopeMode? | "strict" | "permissive" | - | VerifyBase.scopeMode | agent-core/src/verify.ts:50 |
<a id="property-skiprevocationcheck"></a> skipRevocationCheck? | boolean | Verify WITHOUT consulting revocation feeds. Required to be explicit. SECURITY §7 item 7: "Query revocation feeds (Nostr kind-30085 by #delegation) for the cited delegation id before reporting OK, unless the caller explicitly opts out." The default was inverted — revocations were checked only when supplied, and omitting them skipped the check silently, so "checked, clean" was indistinguishable from "never checked". This library has no network by design, so the caller fetches the feed and passes revocations. Declining to is a decision they must state. | VerifyBase.skipRevocationCheck | agent-core/src/verify.ts:63 |
<a id="property-skipsignatureverification"></a> skipSignatureVerification? | boolean | - | VerifyBase.skipSignatureVerification | agent-core/src/verify.ts:49 |
<a id="property-subdelegationchain"></a> subdelegationChain? | SubdelegationEnvelope[] | Optional v1.1 sub-delegation chain from S_1 (immediate child of delegation) to S_leaf (the envelope action.delegation_id cites). When provided, the verifier walks each link checking parent-id linkage, principal-equals- parent-agent, scope containment, and temporal containment. The action's delegation_id MUST equal the leaf's id; the action's signer MUST equal the leaf's agent. See SUB-DELEGATION.md §2.2. | - | agent-core/src/verify.ts:292 |
<a id="property-verifybip322"></a> verifyBip322? | (msg: string, signatureB64: string, address: string) => Promise<boolean> | - | VerifyBase.verifyBip322 | agent-core/src/verify.ts:48 |
<a id="property-verifyotsanchor"></a> verifyOtsAnchor? | (proofB64: string, blockHeight: number, blockHash: string) => Promise<boolean> | - | - | agent-core/src/verify.ts:301 |